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This paper looks from a comparative perspective at different paths of deindustrialization taken by 
Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. Using a sample of 112 developing countries over the 
period between 1990 and 2012, it is analyzed how each deindustrialization source has affected the 
deindustrialization paths of the two country groups. It is found that, the ‘inverted-U’ relationship 
between the share of value added by manufacturing in total GDP and per capita income; the 
continuous downward slope of the inverted-U curve; the Dutch Disease effect; and the emergence of 
China as a major player in the world trade scene have affected the deindustrialization paths of the two 
country groups with different timings, speeds, and degrees.  
 






Since the beginning of the 1970s, many advanced economies have experienced a 
continuous decline in the share of manufacturing in their GDP and employment, a 
phenomenon called deindustrialization. At present, manufacturing sector constitutes only a 
small fraction of GDP and employment in most of those economies that have traditionally 
been referred to as industrial countries. Since the 1990s, a number of developing countries 
including those in the Third World have been following a similar pattern, also embarking on 
the phase of deindustrialization. Indeed, concerns have been raised over the lack of 
dynamism in manufacturing sector reflected in the falling share of manufacturing in GDP 
and employment in these countries. 
Nevertheless, this paper begins by arguing that deindustrialization should not always be 
considered a negative phenomenon but rather a natural consequence of the industrial 
dynamism in a developed economy, following the arguments set forth by Rowthorn and 
Wells (1987). While acknowledging that deindustrialization is a universal phenomenon that 
most countries experience at a certain stage of economic development, it has to be 
understood that the factors that cause deindustrialization differ widely across countries, 
thereby dictating different deindustrialization paths. There are factors of deindustrialization 
that influence most countries and those that affect only a limited number of countries. In 
addition, although given a similar combination of deindustrialization forces in effect, when 
these forces become effective, how rapidly they advance deindustrialization, and to what 
extent they remain effective also vary greatly across individual cases. 
This paper attempts to look from a comparative perspective at different paths of 
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deindustrialization taken by two different groups of countries, Latin America (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela) and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). The research begins by identifying two sources of 
deindustrialization that affect the majority of countries at a certain point over the course of 
economic development: the ‘inverted-U’ relationship between the share of value added by 
manufacturing in total GDP and per capita income; and continuously declining relationship 
between per capita income and the share of value added by manufacturing in total GDP. In 
addition to these, there are two additional deindustrialization forces that influence only a 
limited group of countries: the Dutch Disease effect; and the emergence of China as a major 
player in the world trade scene. 
Using a sample of 112 developing countries over the period between 1990 and 2012, this 
paper shows how each source of deindustrialization mentioned above has affected the 
deindustrialization paths of the two different groups of Latin American and Southeast Asian 
countries with different timings, speeds, and degrees. Throughout this paper, 
deindustrialization is analyzed solely from the point of view of manufacturing added as a 
percentage of GDP. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section will illustrate main findings of 
the existing literature on the determinants of deindustrialization. This discussion provides the 
basis for the theoretical framework of this paper. In the ensuing section, empirical models 
that the authors have formulated based on the theoretical framework will be submitted and 
the empirical results will be presented and discussed. Concluding remarks are provided to 
sum up the paper in the final section. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Table 1 shows how manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP has evolved 
between 1990 and 2010 in various country groups. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
approximately 200 countries in the world have on average experienced a continuous decline 
in the share of manufacturing in their GDP. The OECD countries, those that have 
traditionally been referred to as industrial countries, have not been an exception, also 
showing a deindustrializing trend over the time period. A similar phenomenon is observed in 
a sample of 112 developing countries overall. 
The interest of this paper lies in the different paths of deindustrialization taken by Latin 
American and Southeast Asian countries over the time period mentioned. At an aggregate 
level, Latin America has seen its manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 
decreasing continuously since 1990. However, Southeast Asian countries show a different 
trend, witnessing their manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP increasing until 
2005 but declining since then. The purpose of this paper it to find factors that can explain 
such different trajectories of deindustrialization of Latin American and Southeast Asian 
countries from 1990 to 2012. 
The existing literature acknowledges that deindustrialization should not always be 
considered a negative phenomenon but rather a natural consequence of the industrial 
dynamism in a developed economy (Rowthrorn, 1994; Rowthorn and Wells, 1987; Palma, 
2005). While recognizing that the inverted-U relationship between the share of manufac- 




Table 1. Evolution of manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP (%) 
 































Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
 
turing in employment and per capita income found by Rowthorn is an important factor of 
deindustrialization, Palma argues that deindustrialization is not a mere result of this single 
relationship but a consequence of the interaction of distinct phenomena. Having categorized 
the inverted-U relationship as the first deindustrialization force, he maintains that there are 
additional processes at work that lead countries to de-industrialize. 
The first source of deindustrialization mentioned in this paper is identified by Rowthorn. 
He finds that a decline in manufacturing employment occurs when countries reach a certain 
level of per capita income. In other words, the trajectory of the process of economic 
development follows the inverted-U relationship between the share of manufacturing in 
employment and per capita income. As per capita income increases, the share of employment 
occupied by manufacturing first rises, then at a certain level of per capita income stabilizes, 
and finally falls. The second source of deindustrialization mentioned in this paper is 
identified by Palma. According to him, there is a continuously declining relationship 
between per capita income and the share of manufacturing in employment over time. It is 
argued that the inverted-U relationship is not stable over time but follows a continuous 
downward slope, regardless of whether or not countries have reached the turning point of the 
inverted-U curve. 
Palma also maintains that, in addition to the two sources of deindustrialization mentioned 
beforehand, several countries are affected by a third deindustrialization force: the Dutch 
Disease effect. It has to be emphasized that this phenomenon is only observed in a particular 
group of countries, for example, those abundant in natural resources that generate a trade 
surplus in primary commodities and finance their trade deficits in manufacturing with it. This 
group of countries tends to witness a reduction in the share of manufacturing in employment 
that is greater than what has been expected given the previous two sources of 
deindustrialization mentioned in effect. 
There is indeed an ample literature on this relationship. Matsuyama (1992) analyzes how 
dependence on primary sector leads to deindustrialization using a simple framework. In his 
model, only two sectors exist: agriculture and manufacturing. Agricultural sector directly 
makes use of the factors of production that otherwise would be employed in manufacturing 
sector. Thus, a trade surplus in the agricultural sector eventually leads to deindustrialization. 
Having criticized that his model neglects the existence of a resource sector such as oil 
production that makes use of very little labor and thus does not directly draw employment 
from manufacturing, Sachs and Warner (1995) extend Matsuyama’s framework by dividing 
the economy into three sectors: a tradable natural resource sector, a tradable manufacturing 
sector, and a non-traded sector. Higher natural resource endowment leads to higher demand 
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for non-tradable goods and this consequently results in less allocation of factors of 
production to the manufacturing sector. Thus, when there are natural resources in a country, 
tradable production is concentrated in the natural resource sector rather than the 
manufacturing sector, and capital and labor that otherwise might be employed in 
manufacturing are pulled into the non-traded sector. Therefore, when an economy is 
significantly dependent upon natural resources for exports, its manufacturing sector tends to 
shrink and the non-traded goods sector tends to expand. 
This paper identifies the emergence of China as a major player in the world trade scene as 
another source of deindustrialization affecting a certain group of countries, for example, 
those who have increasingly expanded bilateral trade links with China in various forms. 
There is a growing quantity of literature on the impact of China on developing countries 
caused by the growth of bilateral trade with China (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2011; 
Hogfang and Linglan, 2010; Jenkins, 2009; Phillips, 2006; UNCTAD, 2002). There is a 
consensus in the existing literature that the continued growth and rapid structural 
transformation of China alongside its increasing integration into the world market since the 
1990s carries important consequences for the production and trade structures of many 
developing countries. 
The existing literature points out that the impact of China's rapid industrial development 
has been particularly significant in terms of its increasing demand for primary products. 
However, it is argued that it is hard to determine whether this has truly been beneficial for 
those countries associated with the commodity boom caused by China (Gallagher and 
Porzecanski; Jenkins). According to them, whether China will be a sustained source of 
demand for their primary commodities in the long run and how long commodity prices will 
remain high is one thing, but another thing is that, even if China’s demand for their exports 
and their prices remain high it is possible that it contributes to an incentives structure that 
fuels a process of deindustrialization in the countries associated with a rise in natural 
resources exploitation. This seems to be the case for a number of Latin American countries. 
On the contrary, it appears that China does not pose a serious threat for industrial sectors of a 
handful of countries. For example, a number of Southeast Asian countries are becoming 
increasingly integrated with China through the development of production networks in 
manufacturing sectors which have created a regional division of labor and substantial intra-
industry trade and investment flows. As exports to China are mainly manufactured goods in 
this case, the China effect can lead to industrialization rather than deindustrialization. 
Many developing countries have also witnessed a rapid increase of Chinese presence in 
their domestic manufactured goods markets. The recent rise in imports from China has 
become a matter of growing concern due to the possibility of competition with locally 
produced manufactured goods that could generate a deindustrialization force. Furthermore, 
Jenkins adds that, contrary to some popular perceptions, imports from China are not 
predominantly of low-technology manufactured goods. There is a significant volume of 
imports that are of medium-technology goods and high-technology goods. According to him, 
the share of high-technology imports from China has been increasing while that of low-
technology has tended to fall. Nevertheless, although imports from China are mostly 
manufactured goods, if these are not final goods to be consumed but intermediate goods for 
additional assembly or processing, its effect on the manufacturing sector may potentially be 
positive. 
A meaningful analysis that studies the varying implications of the rise of China on 
developing countries’ manufacturing sectors given the different nature of production and 




trade structures and economic profiles across regions is lacking. This paper argues that, given 
such context, the volume and composition of bilateral trade flows with China have important 
and different implications for manufacturing sectors of Latin American and Southeast Asian 
countries. Especially, different compositions of bilateral trade flows between the two regions 
and China are striking. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS 
 
In order to assess how each deindustrialization force mentioned in the previous section 
has affected deindustrialization paths of Latin American and Southeast Asian countries over 
the study period, cross-country time-series regression analysis is conducted with several 
models that are to follow. 
Regression (1) includes GDP, natural logarithm of per capita income (World Bank, 2014) 
and GDP
2
, the square of natural logarithm of per capita income as independent variables. 
The results of regression (1) confirm the inverted-U relationship between the share of 
manufacturing in employment and per capita income suggested by Rowthorn, although in 
this paper manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP is used as a dependent variable 
instead of the share of manufacturing in employment. The regression results in Table 2 
suggest that, with the coefficient on GDP being 16.54 and GDP
2
 being -1.01, manufacturing  
 
Table 2. Cross-country time-series regressions 1990-2012 
Dependent variable: Manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 

























Y0609  -4.77*** 
(0.51) 








standard errors in parentheses 
*statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level 
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Table 3. Evolution of per capita income ($) 
 



















Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
value added as a percentage of GDP increases with per capita income first but begins to 
decline when countries reach a certain level of per capita income. In this regression, for an 
average country in the sample, the level of per capita income from which manufacturing 
value added as a percentage of GDP begins to decrease is estimated to be $3300. 
As emphasized earlier, this inverted-U relationship is almost universally observed in 
countries over the long term course of economic development. During what is referred to as 
industrialization phase, manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP increases, mainly 
as a result of the transfer of the weight of value added in total GDP from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services. During the next phase, alongside a continuing contraction of 
value added share of agriculture and an expansion of the share of services in total GDP, the 
share of manufacturing stabilizes. Finally, a new phase emerges in which value added in 
manufacturing as a percentage of GDP begins to fall. In the meantime, services continue to 
be the main source of value added absorption. This phase is commonly referred to as the 
deindustrialization phase. 
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 3, Latin American countries overall had already embarked 
on the process of deindustrialization in 1990, despite the fact that their average level of per 
capita income in 1990 and 1995 was lower than the per capita income level from which 
manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP is expected to decrease for an average 
country in the sample in regression (1). Latin America surpassed the estimated turning point 
of the inverted-U curve of $3300 only in 2000. Due to the average level of per capita income 
lower than the critical value of $3300 throughout almost the entire study period, it was 
expected that Southeast Asia overall would not experience deindustrialization at all from 
1990 to 2010. However, Southeast Asia had begun to deindustrialize in 2005, even though 
they still had not reached the critical value of $3300 in 2010. The relationship between 
deindustrialization and per capita income is rather unclear. This suggests that the fact that 
they had reached the per capita income level from which the inverted-U curve begins to 
slope downward does not always lead to deindustrialization. There must have been other 
sources at play that have been affecting the paths of deindustrialization of Latin American 
and Southeast Asian countries. 
Regression (2) adds time dummy variables to regression (1), where, for example, Y9497 
is a dummy variable where Y9497=1 if the year is 1994~1997, and 0 otherwise. The results 
of regression (2) seem to provide a partial answer to the puzzle of Latin American 
deindustrialization between 1990 and 2000 that cannot solely be explained by the inverted-U 
relationship between manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP and per capita 
income. The inverted-U relationship revealed in regression (1) is not stable over time but 
follows a continuous downward slope for an average country in the sample, regardless of 
whether or not countries have reached the turning point of the inverted-U curve. Indeed, the 
coefficient on year dummies decreases over the time period between 1990 and 2012.  




Table 4. Cross-country time-series regressions 1990-2012 
Dependent variable : Manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 

























GDP*PRI  -0.29*** 
(0.06) 
 
GDP2*PRI  0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 
LA   2.60*** 
(0.47) 
SEA   4.82*** 
(0.49) 
CAEE   2.02*** 
(0.49) 
MENA   -0.70 
(0.56) 
Observations 1460 1460 1460 
R2 0.35 0.36 0.41 
All specifications include year dummy variables 
standard errors in parentheses 
*statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level 
 
 
However, it seems that the increasing share of manufacturing value added in GDP in 
Southeast Asian economies from 1990 to 2005 still cannot be explained by the second source 
of deindustrialization. The effect of the second source of deindustrialization had probably 
been felt by Southeast Asia only after 2005. 
Regression (3) adds PRI as additional independent variable to regression (2). This is a 
proxy for primary commodity dependence of a country for exports, that is, dependence on 
the products that are categorized as SITC 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 as a percentage of total exports at 
SITC one-digit level (Author's calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division in 
2014). It is shown in the results of regression (3) that primary commodity dependence as a 
percentage of a country’s total exports is on average negatively related to manufacturing 
value added as a percentage of GDP of that country. This implies that the Dutch Disease 
force has also been at work as an additional deindustrialization force, affecting significantly 
those with high dependence on resources-based sectors for exports. 
As can be seen in Table 5, Latin American countries have been far more dependent upon 
resources-based sectors for their exports than Southeast Asian countries overall. Latin  
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Table 5. Evolution of primary commodity dependence as a percentage of total GDP 
 



















Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
 
America as a region has recorded primary commodity dependence considerably higher than 
an average developing country, while Southeast Asian countries have recorded primary 
commodity dependence much lower than an average developing country. It appears that the 
Dutch disease effect has much contributed to the different paths of industrialization taken by 
the two country groups. Whereas Latin American countries have been heavily affected by the 
deindustrialization force of the Dutch Disease since the beginning of the time period, 
Southeast Asian countries seem to have been much less affected by it on average over the 
study period, thereby leaving more room for industrialization between 1990 and 2005. 
Regression (4) is run with two interaction terms, GDP*PRI and GDP
2
*PRI. The results 
of regression (4) reveal another interesting point regarding the interaction between 
manufacturing value added, per capita income and primary commodity dependence. The two 
interaction terms, GDP*PRI and GDP
2
*PRI, when introduced, decrease the coefficient on 
GDP and increase that on GDP
2
 respectively as PRI increases. This implies that more 
dependence on resources-based sectors for exports further reduces the level of manufacturing 
value added associated with each per capita income level and the level of per capita income 
from which the share of manufacturing value added in GDP begins to fall. This seems to 
provide an additional explanation for Latin American countries’ early deindustrialization 
given their per capita income, deeper degree of it throughout the study period. Again, 
Southeast Asian countries seem to have been much less affected by it on average over the 
study period. 
Regression (5) includes regional dummy variables to regression (3) in order to capture 
overall fixed effects that are time-invariant across each region responsible for the difference 
in manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP between five different regions, Latin 
America, Southeast Asia, Central Asia or Eastern Europe, Middle East or North Africa, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with Sub-Saharan African countries serving as a baseline category. 
In addition to the three deindustrialization forces already mentioned, this paper identifies 
the recent emergence of China as a major player in the world trade scene as another source of 
deindustrialization for a particular group of countries. Nowadays, it is hard to think of a 
region where Chinese influence is absent. The continued growth and rapid structural 
transformation of China alongside its increasing integration into the world market since the 
1990s carries important consequences for the production and trade structures of many 
developing countries including Latin American and Southeast Asian economies. This paper 
measures the impact of China on their manufacturing sectors only from a viewpoint of 
bilateral trade with China. From this perspective, the degree of China effect ultimately 
depends on how much and what they export to and import from China. Indeed, the growth 
and composition of bilateral trade flows with China have fed concerns about 
deindustrialization in many developing economies. 




Table 6. Chinese exports and imports from/to the world and their share in the world 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Exports ($ billion) 
Share in the world (%) 
Imports ($ billion) 





















Source: Author’s calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
 
The recent increase in Chinese share in the world trade has been exceptional. China has 
experienced dramatic export and import booms over the past two decades. Table 6 shows 
that Chinese exports surged from $62.1 billion in 1990 to $249.2 billion in 2000 and $1.5 
trillion in 2010, increasing China’s share from 2.0 percent of total world exports in 1990 to 
4.0 percent in 2000 and 10.9 percent in 2010. Imports also rose from $53.3 billion in 1990 to 
$225.1 billion in 2000 and 1.3 trillion in 2010, increasing China’s share from 1.6 percent of 
total world imports in 1990 to 3.6 percent in 2000 and 9.5 percent in 2010. 
 
Table 7. Cross-country time-series regressions 1990-2012 
Dependent variable: Manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 























































CHINAEXP*CHINAGL   0.55*** 
(0.18) 
 
CHINAIMP*CHINAGL    0.79*** 
(0.17) 
Observations 1361 1343 1343 1343 
R2 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 
All specifications include year and regional dummy variables 
standard errors in parentheses 
*statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level 
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Regression (6) includes two additional variables to regression (5), CHINAEXP, Chinese 
share as a percentage of a country’s total exports (Author’s calculations, based on United 
Nations Statistics Division), CHINAIMP, Chinese share as a percentage of a country’s total 
imports (Author’s calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division). It measures the 
impact of higher trade share with China on the dependent variable. The results of regression 
(6) imply that more dependence on China for exports and imports in terms of trade share on 
average negatively affect manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP of a country. 
The reason why higher trade share with China negatively affects manufacturing value 
added as a percentage of GDP of an average country in the sample mainly stems from the 
exporting and importing structures of China. Table 8 shows how the exporting structure of 
the country has evolved over time, following the Standard International Trade Classification 
one-digit classification. In all years, the three key sectors are manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured 
goods. These three sectors add up to 79.2% of total exports in 1995, 84.7% in 2000, 88.6% in 
2005, and 89.2% in 2010, showing that the weight of the three sectors of total exports has 
increased over time. The evolution of machinery and transport equipment exports has been 
impressive. It accounted 21.1% of total exports in 1995 but 49.5% in 2010. Thus, the story is 
quite straightforward when the impact of imports from China on manufacturing sectors of 
developing countries is concerned. Products that are imported from China are mainly 
manufactured goods as indicated in the exporting structure of China. They may create 
competition with locally produced manufactured goods generating a deindustrialization force. 
Although imports from China are mostly manufactured goods, if these are not final goods to 
be consumed but intermediate goods that are for additional assembly or processing, its effect 
on the manufacturing sector may potentially be positive. 
Table 9 shows how the importing structure of the country has changed over time. Crude 
materials except food and fuel and mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials have 
increased their share whereas manufactured goods classified chiefly by material has lost its 
share over time. China has increasingly become more dependent upon raw materials for its 
imports. A large share of machinery and transport equipment in total imports that has been 
quite stable over time is due to the existence of considerable intra-industry trade. The results 
of Table 8 and 9 reflect that China has turned into a regional production center and  
 
Table 8. Evolution of exporting structure of China (% of total exports) 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 









































Source: Author’s calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division. 




Table 9. Evolution of importing structure of China (% of total exports) 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 









































Source: Author’s calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
 
manufacturing point for re-exports. While China is a major export market for many 
developing countries, the composition of exports to China varies considerably across 
countries. As can be seen in the importing structure of China, some have become more 
dependent upon raw materials while some have tended to rely more on manufactured goods 
for exports to China along the growth of China over the past decades. Intuitively, if exports 
to China mainly stem from resources-based sectors, the possibility of deindustrialization may 
be greater, and if a country’s exports to China are concentrated in manufactured goods, its 
effect on the manufacturing sector may be positive. 
The rise of China as a major trade player and consequent increase in Chinese share in 
total exports and imports have clearly acted as an impetus for deindustrialization for an 
average developing country in the sample. However, what Table 10 shows is rather puzzling: 
it is shown that Chinese share as a percentage of total exports and imports has on average 
been greater for the Southeast Asian group than the Latin American group. If one follows the 
logic derived from the results of regression (6), a bigger weight of China in total trade is 
expected to generate a bigger deindustrialization force. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned 
before, Southeast Asia has witnessed its manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 
increasing until 2005, whereas Latin America has seen its manufacturing value added as a 
percentage of GDP decreasing continuously since 1990. This suggests that, despite the fact 
that China acts as an apparent deindustrialization force for an average country in the sample 
as shown in regression (6), depending on the composition of bilateral trade flows with her, 
the China effect could act as an industrialization force for a certain group of countries. The 
difference in the composition of bilateral trade flows with China indeed carries significantly 
different consequences for the manufacturing sectors of many developing countries. 
Given the additional need to capture the effect of the difference in trade composition with 
China on manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP, a variable that measures the 
share of intra-industry trade in total trade, regression (7) adds another independent variable, 
CHINAGL, weighted Grubel-Lloyd index at Standard International Trade Classification one-
digit level between a country and China (Author's calculations, based on United Nations 
Statistics Division in 2014), to regression (6). The regression results of regression (7) suggest 
that intra-industry trade with China is overall positively related to the dependent variable.  
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Table 10. Evolution of Chinese share as a percentage of total exports and imports (%) 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 


































Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
 
With the introduction of the variable capturing the effect of intra-industry trade with China, 
the coefficient on SEA decreases significantly to a level below that on LA. 
Now, one should turn to the question of how trade with China has affected the 
manufacturing sectors of Latin American and Southeast Asian countries in different ways. 
For several Latin American economies, the emergence of China has truly led to an unseen 
demand for their exports. However, this trade relationship is not without problems when one 
looks at the composition of their exports to China. Table 11 shows the composition of 
exports of the top four Latin American exporters to China in 2006 and 2011. It is clear that 
these countries have heavily relied on traditional resources-based sectors for exports to China. 
This can represent the troubling scenario for their manufacturing sectors, especially of the 
majority of South American countries that have been unable to compete in the world market 
for manufactured products. Indeed, the exporting structure of Latin American countries to 
China has contributed to an incentives structure that fuels a process of deindustrialization in 
the countries associated with a rise in natural resources exploitation. 
At the same time, the rapid growth in imports from China over the past decades has been 
seen as a factor contributing to deindustrialization in a number of Latin American countries, 
negatively affecting prices, production, and employment of their manufacturing sectors. 
Table 12 shows the composition of imports of the top four Latin American importers from  
 
Table 11. Composition of selected Latin American countries’ exports to China (%) 
 
Argentina Brazil Chile Peru 
06 11 06 11 06 11 06 11 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 

















































































Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division. 




Table 12. Composition of selected Latin American countries’ imports from China (%) 
 
Chile Mexico Paraguay Peru 
06 11 06 11 06 11 06 11 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 

















































































Source: Author’s calculations, based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
China in 2006 and 2011. One can see that imports from China to these countries are highly 
concentrated in manufactured goods. The type of goods imported from China is the reverse 
of that noted for Latin American exports to China in Table 10. Given the composition of 
Chinese imports penetrating Latin American markets, there is a possibility of Chinese 
competition displacing locally produced manufactured goods. 
When one considers the trade relationship between Southeast Asian economies and China, 
the point of discussion about possible impacts of the emergence of China changes 
substantially. Although it is equally true that bilateral trade between the two sides has grown 
at exceptionally high rates over the past decades, its relationship is characterized by the 
existence of a significant volume of intra-industry trade between the two sides, contrary to 
that between China and Latin American countries in which inter-industry trade is dominant. 
Table 13 shows the composition of exports of the top four Southeast Asian exporters to 
China in 2006 and 2011. Compared to the top four Latin American exporters to China in 
Table 10, these economies have relied considerably more on manufacturing sectors for 
exports to China, with the exception of Vietnam. The composition of imports of the top four 
Southeast Asian importers from China in 2006 and 2011 that can be seen in Table 14 is not 
too different from that of the top four Latin American importers. Imports from China to 
Southeast Asian countries are also mostly manufactured goods. The similar composition of 
Southeast Asian countries’ exports and imports to and from China implies that a significant 
volume of intra-industry trade exists between the two sides. 
The dominant portion of the intra-industry trade between China and Southeast Asian 
economies is a result of regional production sharing networks or the division of labor 
between the two sides. Ando and Kimura (2003) point out that vertical intra-industry trade is 
especially noteworthy, where transactions are characterized by back-and-forth trade links in 
which a number of countries in the region participate in various stages of single production 
chains. For example, a country can participate in the production network in various forms: 
exporting primary inputs, importing inputs for assembly, exporting intermediate goods for 
additional processing by third country, or importing intermediate inputs for additional 
processing and exporting final goods. The most important source of complementarity 
between intra-industry trade within the regional production network between China and  




Table 14. Composition of selected Southeast Asian countries’ imports from China (%) 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam Thailand 
06 11 06 11 06 11 06 11 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 

















































































Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
 
Table 15. Evolution of weighted Grubel-Lloyd index 
 



















Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
 
Table 13. Composition of selected Southeast Asian countries’ exports to China (%) 
 
Malaysia Philippines Vietnam Thailand 
06 11 06 11 06 11 06 11 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials except food and fuel 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals products 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 

















































































Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division. 




Southeast Asian economies lies in the proximity of these economies to one another. 
Because of low transport costs and low trade barriers between the two sides, growth in trade 
with China has tended to favor an expansion in intra-industry trade between China and 
Southeast Asian economies. 
Table 15 shows that Southeast Asian countries have been far more dependent upon intra-
industry trade in total trade with China than Latin American countries overall, following the 
Standard International Trade Classification one-digit classification. The Southeast Asian 
group has recorded weighted Grubel-Lloyd index significantly higher than an average 
developing country, while Latin America as a region has recorded weighted Grubel-Lloyd 
index slightly lower than an average developing country. It appears that the share of intra-
industry trade in total trade with China has greatly contributed to the different paths of 
industrialization taken by the two country groups. Results of regression (7) show that, 
whereas both exporting to China and importing from China are overall negatively related to 
manufacturing value added as a share of GDP of a country, intra-industry trade is positively 
related to the dependent variable. As the coefficient on CHINAGL is much bigger than those 
on CHINAEXP and CHINAIMP, a significant share of intra-industry trade in total trade can 
cancel the negative effects of exporting to China and importing from China on the 
manufacturing sector of a country. Southeast Asian countries are able to cancel the negative 
effects of exporting to China and importing from China due to the significant volume of 
intra-industry trade, while Latin American countries are not able to do so because of the 
absence of intra-industry trade link with China. 
This becomes clear when an interaction term between CHINAEXP or CHINAIMP and 
CHINAGL is introduced. Regression (8) and regression (9) respectively include 
CHINAEXP*CHINAGL and CHINAIMP*CHINAGL to regression (7). The results of 
regression (8) show that, when the interaction term is introduced, the coefficient on 
CHINAEXP increases as CHINAGL increases. This implies that, if the share of intra-
industry trade in total trade with China exceeds a threshold level, the sign of the coefficient 
on CHINAEXP can be reversed. The trend is similar when another interaction term is 
introduced. The results of regression (9) show that, when the interaction term between 
CHINAIMP and CHINAGL is introduced, the coefficient on CHINAIMP also increases as 
CHINGL increases. Similarly, after exceeding a threshold level, the sign of the coefficient on 
CHINAIMP can be reversed. 
The recent emergence of China as a major player in the world trade scene, the last source 
of deindustrialization identified in this paper has different implications for Latin American 
and Southeast Asian countries. It appears that the China effect has acted as a significant 
deindustrialization force for the Latin American group over the study period, thereby 
reinforcing the previous three forces of deindustrialization. On the contrary, trade with China 
seems to have played a key role in Southeast Asian industrialization between 1990 and 2005, 
cancelling the deindustrialization forces imposed by the previous three sources. It was only 




4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Even though deindustrialization is a natural phenomenon that most countries experience 
at a certain stage of economic development, different countries are affected by different 
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combinations of deindustrialization forces. This paper first distinguishes between the factors 
of deindustrialization that influence most countries and those that affect only a limited 
number of countries. Then it is posited that, although given a similar combination of 
deindustrialization forces in effect, when these forces become effective, how rapidly they 
advance deindustrialization, and to what extent they remain effective also vary greatly across 
individual countries. These hypotheses are confirmed through empirical results presented in 
this paper demonstrating different paths of deindustrialization between 1990 and 2012 taken 
by two different groups of countries, Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. This 
paper examines how the different sources of deindustrialization mentioned have influenced 
the varying deindustrialization paths of the two groups over the study period. 
The inverted-U relationship between manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 
and per capita income has had limited effects on both country groups. The first source of 
deindustrialization has only begun to become significantly effective in the Latin American 
group since 2000. For Southeast Asian countries, it seems to have had little effect throughout 
the entire time period examined. This implies that there must have been other sources at play 
that have been affecting the paths of deindustrialization of Latin American and Southeast 
Asian countries. The second source of deindustrialization introduced in this paper which is 
the continuous downward slope of the inverted-U curve seems to have contributed to the 
Latin American deindustrialization over the entire study period. Nevertheless, the increasing 
share of manufacturing value added in GDP in Southeast Asian economies from 1990 to 
2005 still remains unexplained. It seems that the second source of deindustrialization has 
been cancelled out by some other industrialization forces. 
It appears that the Dutch disease effect has contributed significantly to the different paths 
of deindustrialization of the two country groups. Whereas Latin American countries have 
been heavily affected by the deindustrialization force of the Dutch Disease since the 
beginning of the time period, Southeast Asian countries seem to have been much less 
affected by it on average. Also, it is found that more dependence on primary sector further 
reduces the level of manufacturing value added associated with each per capita income level 
and the level of per capita income from which manufacturing value added begins to fall. This 
seems to provide an additional explanation for Latin American countries’ early 
deindustrialization given their per capita income, deeper degree of it throughout the time 
period, and the reverse trend observed in Southeast Asian economies. 
The recent emergence of China as a major player in the world trade scene has had 
different implications for Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. After all, it is the 
difference in the composition rather than volume of bilateral trade flows with China that 
carries contrasting consequences for the two regions’ manufacturing sectors. This paper 
shows that the share of intra-industry trade in exports and imports with China has contributed 
immensely to the different paths of industrialization taken by the two country groups. The 
China effect has acted as a significant deindustrialization force for the Latin American group 
over the study period, thereby reinforcing the previous three sources of deindustrialization. 
On the contrary, trade with China seems to have played a key role in Southeast Asian 
industrialization between 1990 and 2005, cancelling the deindustrialization forces imposed 
by the previous three sources. It was only after 2005 when the industrializing China effect 
became dominated by the other sources of deindustrialization. 
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